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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
Appellants Ronald and Evelyn Gulla challenge the 
dismissal of their federal civil rights claims based on the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Because we conclude that the 




The Gullas own a home in North Strabane Township,  
Pennsylvania.1 In April 1993, Lindencreek Associates 
("Lindencreek") applied to the Township for permission to 
subdivide and develop land adjacent to the Gullas' 
property. The Township's Board of Supervisors approved 
Lindencreek's proposal on June 28, 1994. 
 
The Gullas were first informed of the Board's approval in 
July 1994 when Lindencreek notified them that 
construction of the subdivision would interfere with their 
spring, which was located on land within the new 
subdivision, and the right-of-way that conveyed spring 
water to the Gullas' home. Shortly after Lindencreek gave 
this notice, its contractors T.A. Ward Constructors ("Ward") 
and Advanced Building Development ("ABD"), began 
excavating on the subdivision property. This excavation 
destroyed the Gullas' spring and a water line in their right- 
of-way. The Gullas demanded that Lindencreek and its 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Because the district court dismissed the Gullas' claims for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction, we draw these facts from the allegations in 
the Gullas' complaint. See Liberty Lincoln-Mercury v. Ford Motor Co., 134 
F.3d 557, 571 n.18 (3d Cir. 1998); Kachmar v. Sungard Data Systems, 
Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 175 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
                                3 
  
contractors restore the spring and water line, but 
Lindencreek did not make the requested repairs. 
 
The Gullas appealed the Board of Supervisors' approval 
of the subdivision to the Court of Common Pleas of 
Washington County. In that court, the Gullas alleged that 
the actions and policies of the Township "violate[d] due 
process and equal protection provisions of the state and 
United States Constitutions." The Gullas further alleged 
that the Board's decision to approve the Lindencreek 
subdivision was "invalid, arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion and contrary to law." The Court of Common 
Pleas affirmed the Board's approval of the subdivision and 
dismissed the Gullas' appeal. The court held that, under 
Pennsylvania law, the Gullas lacked standing to challenge 
the subdivision approval. Alternatively, the court concluded 
that the Township followed the applicable ordinances and 
statutes governing the subdivision process. The Gullas 
appealed this decision to the Commonwealth Court of 
Pennsylvania, which affirmed the lower court's decision. 
The Gullas filed an allocatur petition with the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania, which granted review. That appeal is 
pending. 
 
After the Commonwealth Court issued its opinion, the 
Gullas brought suit in federal district court. The Gullas 
alleged that Lindencreek, its owner Alan Axelson, Ward, 
ABD, North Strabane Township, and Norma Wintermyer (a 
member of the Township Board of Supervisors) violated 
their civil rights as guaranteed by the Due Process, Equal 
Protection, and Just Compensation Clauses of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 
The Gullas also asserted pendent state-law causes of action 
against all of the defendants except the Township. 
 
The defendants to the Gullas' federal suit moved to 
dismiss. The district court granted this motion because it 
concluded that the Gullas' federal claims were barred by 
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The district court declined to 
exercise jurisdiction over the Gullas' remaining state-law 
claims and therefore dismissed those claims without 
prejudice. The Gullas appealed these dismissals to this 
court. 
 




Since the grant of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction is subject to plenary review, FOCUS v. 
Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 
839-40 (3d Cir. 1996), we must independently decide 
whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars the Gullas' 
federal claims. In so doing, we are mindful of our obligation 
to preserve the avenues of direct review established by 
Congress. Asarco, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 622-23, 109 
S.Ct. 2037, 2048-49 (1989). Under 28 U.S.C. S 1257, state 
court litigants who have appealed an adverse judgment 
through the state system may seek review in the United 
States Supreme Court; the lower federal courts may not sit 
in direct review of the decisions of a state tribunal. District 
of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 
482, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 1314-15 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity 
Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416, 44 S.Ct. 149, 150 (1923); 
Guarino v. Larsen, 11 F.3d 1151, 1156-57 (3d Cir. 1993); 
Port Auth. Police Benev. Ass'n v. Port Auth., 973 F.2d 169, 
178 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 
While the rule barring our appellate review of state 
decisions is easily stated, the test for determining whether 
a particular litigant seeks such direct review is more 
complex. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, lower federal 
courts cannot entertain constitutional claims that have 
been previously adjudicated in state court or that are 
inextricably intertwined with such a state adjudication. 
FOCUS, 75 F.3d at 840; Blake v. Papadakos, 953 F.2d 68, 
71 (3d Cir. 1992). A federal claim is inextricably intertwined 
with a prior state adjudication if 
 
       the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the 
       state court wrongly decided the issues before it. In 
       other words, Rooker-Feldman precludes a federal action 
       if the relief requested in the federal action would 
       effectively reverse the state decision or void its ruling. 
       Accordingly, to determine whether Rooker-Feldman 
       bars [plaintiff's] federal suit requires determining 
       exactly what the state court held. . . . If the relief 
       requested in the federal action requires determining 
       that the state court's decision is wrong or would void 
       the state court's ruling, then the issues are inextricably 
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       intertwined and the district court has no subject 
       matter jurisdiction to hear the suit. 
 
FOCUS, 75 F.3d at 840 (omissions and alterations in 
original) (quoting Charchenko v. City of Stillwater, 47 F.3d 
981, 983 n.1 (8th Cir. 1995)). 
 
As this passage from FOCUS indicates, thefirst step in a 
Rooker-Feldman analysis is to determine "exactly what the 
state court held." Id. Accordingly, we begin by examining 
the judgments of the Pennsylvania courts. 
 
In their first court filing, the Gullas alleged that the 
Township's actions in considering and approving the 
Lindencreek subdivision "violate[d] the due process and 
equal protection provisions of the state and United States 
Constitutions" and that the Board of Supervisors' decision 
was "invalid, arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion 
and contrary to law." App. at 67a-71a. The Court of 
Common Pleas responded to these allegations by first 
addressing the issue of the Gullas' standing. The court 
concluded that, under Pennsylvania law, adjacent 
landowners with a private interest in the property of a 
proposed subdivision do not have standing to challenge the 
approval of the subdivision. See Gulla v. North Strabane 
Township, Civ. Div. No. 94-3933 at 2-4 (C.P. of Washington 
County Sep. 18, 1995). Since the Gullas alleged an injury 
to private rights that they received by deed, the court held 
that they could not challenge the subdivision proceedings. 
See id. Additionally, the court analyzed and rejected the 
Gullas' claim that the Township and Lindencreek failed to 
comply with the ordinances governing the subdivision 
process. The court emphasized that, even if the Township's 
ordinances had been violated, the Gullas lacked standing 
because "the Township is not permitted to consider the 
private rights of individuals before granting subdivision 
approval" and because the Township's environmental 
regulations are "unaffected by the alleged private water 
rights of individuals." Id. at 4-5. Despite this conclusion 
that the Gullas lacked standing, the court substantively 
analyzed whether the defendants complied with the 
Township's ordinances. The court concluded that the 
Township followed the procedures for approving a 
subdivision and that Lindencreek's final subdivision plan 
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contained all of the information necessary to comply with 
the Township's development and environmental ordinances. 
 
If the Court of Common Pleas had closed its opinion with 
the analysis just discussed, we would easily conclude that 
the opinion does not invoke the Rooker-Feldman  doctrine to 
bar the Gullas' federal claims. "Rooker-Feldman applies only 
when in order to grant the federal plaintiff the relief sought, 
the federal court must determine that the state court 
judgment was erroneously entered or must take action that 
would render that judgment ineffectual." FOCUS, 75 F.3d at 
840. The essence of the Court of Common Pleas' opinion is 
that, under Pennsylvania law, the Gullas lack standing to 
challenge the subdivision process. Since the Gullas' 
standing to bring their federal claims is solely a matter of 
federal law, the district court clearly could consider the 
Gullas' due process, equal protection, and Fifth 
Amendment takings claims without disturbing the state 
court's conclusion. However, at the end of its discussion 
about whether Lindencreek's plan complied with the 
Township's environmental ordinance, the state court added: 
"Because Lindencreek Associated complied with all federal, 
state, and local requirements, [the Gullas'] assertion of 
error, based solely on private rights is inappropriate in the 
instant action." Gulla, Civ. Div. No. 94-3933 at 5. 
 
The defendants collectively assert that this concluding 
statement summarily rejected the Gullas' due process and 
equal protection claims on the merits. If this contention is 
true, then we must conclude that the state court's opinion 
bars at least some of the Gullas' federal claims. If a state 
court considers and rejects a constitutional claim on the 
merits, a paucity of explicit analysis in the court's opinion 
will not strip the holding of its validity for purposes of 
Rooker-Feldman's jurisdictional bar. Indeed, in Feldman, 
the state court adjudicated the plaintiff 's constitutional 
claims summarily and did not refer to each of the claims 
when it issued its per curiam order. Nevertheless, the state 
court decision was sufficient to invoke the jurisdictional bar 
because "Feldman had raised his legal claims in a petition 
to the court and the court had issued an overarching 
decision . . . thus implicitly denying all of his legal claims." 
Guarino, 11 F.3d at 1159-60. 
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However, upon careful scrutiny of the Court of Common 
Pleas' opinion, we conclude that the court did not expressly 
or implicitly adjudicate the Gullas' constitutional claims. 
The Gullas' claims were procedurally styled as an appeal of 
the Township's approval of the Lindencreek subdivision, 
and the court's ruling is clearly based on its conclusion 
that the Gullas lack standing to bring such a suit. Under 
Pennsylvania law, the court could not resolve the merits of 
the Gullas' claims if they lack standing to bring their suit. 
See, e.g., Nye v. Erie Ins. Exch., 470 A.2d 98, 100 (Pa. 
1983); In re T.J., 699 A.2d 1311, 1314 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1997); Building Indus. Assoc. v. Manheim Township, 1998 
WL 169270, at *6 (Pa.Commw. Ct. April 14, 1998) ("when 
[the Court of] Common Pleas determined that[the plaintiff] 
lacked standing . . . , it no longer possessed jurisdiction 
over the case to address any of the merits."); 
Commonwealth v. Desiderio, 698 A.2d 134, 140 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1997). In light of this well-established 
principle, we believe that the court's opinion cannot be cast 
as an adjudication of the Gullas' constitutional claims. 
Moreover, to the extent that the state court commented 
upon the merits, it limited its discussion to the question of 
whether the Township failed to follow the express 
provisions of its subdivision and environmental ordinances. 
It is in the context of this discussion that the court stated 
that Lindencreek "complied with all federal, state, and local 
requirements." Gulla, Civ. Div. No. 94-3933 at 5. Read in 
context, we believe this statement refers to compliance with 
technical zoning and environmental regulations, and not to 
a conclusion that the Township's actions satisfied the 




2. We recognize that the inclusion of the word"federal" in this quote 
could imply that the court considered and rejected the Gullas' federal 
constitutional claims. However, in the same sentence the court 
reaffirmed that the Gullas' "assertion of error, based solely on private 
rights is inappropriate in the instant action." Gulla, Civ. Div. No. 94- 
3933 at 5. In light of this conclusion that the Gullas lacked standing to 
bring their suit, we conclude that the court did not issue an overarching 
decision on the merits of the Gullas' claims. Moreover, even if this 
statement could be cast as an adjudication of the Gullas' federal claims, 
it could not invoke the Rooker-Feldman bar since the commentary on the 
merits followed a conclusion that the Gullas' lacked standing. See 
Hawksbill Sea Turtle v. FEMA, 126 F.3d 461, 475 (3d Cir. 1997). 
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Likewise, the decision of the Commonwealth Court does 
not bar the Gullas' federal claims under the Rooker- 
Feldman doctrine. The Commonwealth Court held that the 
Court of Common Pleas "correctly found that the Gullas did 
not have standing to appeal the subdivision approval 
process." Gulla v. North Strabane Township, No. 2696 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. April 9, 1996). The Commonwealth Court 
therefore affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the Gullas' 
claims. See id. Since the Commonwealth Court's reasoning 
parallels that discussed above, we conclude that its 
decision is not inextricably intertwined with the Gullas' 
federal claims. 
 
As an alternative basis for affirmance, the defendants 
suggest that the decisions of the Court of Common Pleas 
and the Commonwealth Court preclude the Gullas' federal 
action under traditional principles of claim and issue 
preclusion. In Feldman, the Supreme Court noted that a 
litigant who raises some but not all of its constitutional 
claims in state court may be precluded from raising those 
claims in any other forum. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 
n.16, 103 S.Ct. at 1302 n. 16. Likewise, we have stated 
that "[w]hen a litigant expects that a court is willing to 
consider its legal claims, raises some of those claims, and 
has those claims adjudicated, it makes sense to apply 
normal principles of claim preclusion to hold that the 
litigant has waived any legal claims he or she fails to raise 
which have arisen from the same transaction." Guarino, 11 
F.3d at 1160. 
 
In this case, we conclude that the Gullas are not 
precluded from bringing their federal claims because the 
state court could not and did not adjudicate the merits of 
their constitutional claims. Rather, the state court noted 
that the Gullas lacked standing to raise their constitutional 
claims in an appeal of the Board's subdivision decision. 
Since the Gullas could not obtain an adjudication of their 
claims in state court, they are not precluded from raising 
their constitutional claims in the federal forum. See, e.g., 
Hawksbill Sea Turtle v. FEMA, 126 F.3d 461, 475 (3d Cir. 
1997) (quoting 18 Charles A. Wright, et al., Federal Practice 
and Procedure S 4421, at 207-08 ("If afirst decision is 
supported by findings that deny the power of the court to 
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decide the case on the merits and by findings that reach 
the merits, preclusion is inappropriate as to thefindings on 
the merits.")); Guarino, 11 F.3d at 1161-62 & n.8 ("A 
litigant suffers no real harm by attempting to raise his or 
her constitutional claim in state court: if the state court 
refuses to address the constitutional claim, the litigant can 
then raise the claim in federal court without any 
jurisdictional, abstention, or collateral estoppel problems."); 
Valenti v. Mitchell, 962 F.2d 288, 296 (3d Cir. 1992) (stating 
that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and claim preclusion will 
only apply when litigants have had a "full and fair 
opportunity to litigate their . . . claim in state court."). 
 
Since we conclude that the Gullas are not precluded from 
bringing their federal claims, we need not address their 
assertion that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar 
their claim against Norma Wintermyer because she was not 
a party to the state suit in her individual capacity. 
Likewise, we do not consider the Gullas' argument that 
their federal claims escape the Rooker-Feldman bar because 
they are allegedly based on newly discovered facts. We also 
decline to address the argument that the Gullas failed to 
state a claim against ABD and Ward. If the Gullas failed to 
state a claim against these defendants, the district court 
may have to consider whether it will allow them to amend 
their pleadings. Accordingly, we should allow the district 
court to address this argument in the first instance. See, 
e.g., Hudson United Bank v. Litenda Mortgage Corp., 1998 
WL 173101, at *7-8 (3rd Cir. Apr. 15, 1998). 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the order of the 
district court entered on April 24, 1997 and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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NYGAARD, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
I dissent because I believe the federal and state claims 
are inextricably intertwined. Hence, the majority's holding 
contravenes the Rooker-Feldman doctrine by permitting a 
federal court to review and potentially contradict a ruling of 
a state court of general jurisdiction. 
 
The gravamen of Gulla's claim, which is contained in his 
appeal in the Court of Common Pleas of Washington 
County, Pennsylvania and in his complaint in the Federal 
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, is 
essentially that he was not given the notice to which he 
alleges he was entitled by law concerning subdivision 
proceedings in North Strabane Township. 
 
Specifically, in his Notice of Appeal from the decision of 
the North Strabane Township Board of Supervisors, Gulla 
complained that he received no notice of the subdivision 
process. Gulla alleged that in doing so the supervisors 
violated Section 304 of the Township subdivision and land 
development ordinance, which, among other things, 
dictates the process it must follow when it considers a 
major subdivision request. He averred that as a result, the 
Township "violated due process and equal protection 
provisions of the state and the United States 
Constitutions." In the Federal District Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania, he again alleged that "no 
notice was ever given to the Gullas concerning the 
subdivision process." And that as a result, "defendants 
have violated the civil rights of the plaintiffs." 
 
The Court of Common Pleas held that under the 
ordinance Gulla was not entitled to notice of the 
proceedings; consequently none of his rights were violated 
when he was not given notice; he was simply not a person 
aggrieved by the law. In so ruling, the judge used the 
phrase "appellants lack standing to challenge the 
subdivision proceedings." Nonetheless, Gulla received a full 
adjudication of his rights in the state court because his 
entitlement to notice, hence any violations thereof, were 
inextricably intertwined with a decision that he was neither 
a person entitled to notice, nor aggrieved by the law. Gulla 
admits that the state court found "that state procedures 
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were not violated." (Appellant's Br. at 3.) That is the essence 
and basis of his claim to notice of the subdivision 
proceedings, and which was affirmed on appeal to the 
Commonwealth Court. By concluding that the district court 
may rehear the matter, we are allowing a federal court to 
improperly sit in secondary judgment on a matter already 
decided by a state court. If, on remand, the district court 
decides that Gulla was entitled to notice, it will be 
determining that the decision of the Court of Common Pleas 
was wrong and in so doing void its ruling -- something it 
is not empowered to do. 
 
This is not a typical matter in which, because the 
plaintiff "lacked standing" to present his claim, his claim 
was neither heard nor decided on the merits. Here, the 
merits are inextricably intertwined with the "standing" 
decision and the state courts' rulings that Gulla is not 
entitled by the ordinance to receive notice. Gulla has 
received his day in state court, and I think the district 
court was correct when it refused to give him another one 
in federal court. I would affirm. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
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